How War in Ukraine Has Shaped Migration Flows in Central Asia

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Highlights

- War in Ukraine induced a large increase in population flows from Russia to Central Asia, both with tourism and reallocation purposes
- Reallocation from Russia is predominantly high-skill, which should have strong potential benefits for the economic and technological development of CA countries
- To realize this potential, the national governments need to develop both economic and non-economic measures helping to absorb immigration-induced high-skill labour supply
- Labour migration from CA to Russia (almost) didn't react to the war and related issues, while the increased inflow of remittances was highly likely associated with transfers of Russian residents
- Taking into account the high dependency on remittances from Russia, CA national governments should keep monitoring the ongoing trends and have ready policy decisions in case the Russian market will become less attractive for CA labour migrants

Background

Central Asian states have long held migratory links with the Russian Federation. The now predominantly labour market related migrant flows from Central Asia to Russia find their origin not only in a common language, but also through a shared political, economic and even cultural legacy – as well as in the infrastructural landlocked constraints facing parts of Central Asia and the social and economic linkages that continue to connect the region. During the last two decades, labour remittances from Russia have constituted a significant part of household income in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and to a certain extent in Kazakhstan. To this end, they have played a crucial role in maintaining living standards, mitigating against poverty, and facilitating investment in human capital (Alpaslan et al., 2021; World Bank, 2023). Indeed, when the COVID-19, pandemic related mobility restrictions hit in 2020, the fall in remittances represented a major economic shock – particularly to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Just as remittance income was starting to recover from COVID-19, Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine heralded a new 'shock' to transnational migration in the former Soviet region and beyond. Besides the massive flow of Ukrainians to Europe and other countries, there were changes in the migration of Central Asians to Russia, but also a new dynamic of war-induced migration (or reallocation) from Russia, to Central Asia. While Russia's outward migration was international in nature, the pull-factors of Central Asia are evident: visa free regimes with Russia, geographical as well as cultural proximity, assumptions about familiarity, linguistic commonalities and relatively low living costs. The nature and scale of this migration and its potential effects on the host countries have not been systematically studied and are therefore the topic of this policy brief.

Emigration of Russians to Central Asia in 2022

While the data shows that the number of Russians leaving for Western countries decreased in 2022, exits to many other countries increased and, in some destinations, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan (as well as Mongolia, UAE, Iran, and Armenia), substantially exceeded the pre-pandemic levels. In Kazakhstan, the number of inflows of Russian citizens increased sharply (more than tripling) but remained at lower levels compared to the pre-pandemic period (Figure 1). The number of exits to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan more than doubled in 2022, increasing by over half a million people as compared to the pre-pandemic numbers (Figure 1). The increase by countries varies from 68% (Kyrgyzstan) to 148% (Uzbekistan) growth.

Figure 1. Exits of Russians to CA countries, 2016 -2022 (thousands of people)



Source: author's calculations based on Rosstat data.

Of course, not all of these inflows reflect war-induced emigration as the numbers also incorporate tourist flows redirected from Western countries, double counts, and (credit) 'card tourism', which arose from the restrictions imposed on Russian banks after the beginning of the war. (Many Russians often visited Central Asia simply to open accounts in local banks and obtain globally serviceable credit cards). In other words, the numbers in these data indicate an upper bound estimate of the number of Russian emigrants relocating to Central Asia in 2022.[1]

Figure 2. Exits from Russia of Russian citizens vs. their entries to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (2016-2022), people



1 Immigration statistics demonstrate gaps in data availability. Therefore, the current analysis is limited to official data from open sources, data requests, and publications in mass media.



Source: author's calculations based on national statistical bodies- Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan

Figure 2 compares the exits of Russian citizens from Russia based on Russian sources with the entries of Russian citizens to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan obtained from the respective national statistical bodies.[2] In both cases, entries are strongly correlated with exits and follow a similar seasonal pattern: the inflow of Russians increased from the 1st to the 3rd quarter and then declined in the 4th quarter. The recovery of the inflow of Russians visiting Kazakhstan after COVID-19 in 2021 was at a lower level compared to Kyrgyzstan.

The number of entries of Russians to both countries is larger than the number of their exits from Russia. In the case of Kazakhstan exits from Russia constituted about 90% of all entries of Russian citizens to Kazakhstan. In Kyrgyzstan the percentage was much less, fluctuating from 55% to 80%. The bigger gap between exits and entries in Kyrgyzstan might be explained by the transit of Russian visitors to Kyrgyzstan through other countries. It also means that exits from Russia may heavily underestimate the inflow of Russians to countries without a common land border with Russia. This is consistent with the smaller gaps observed during the period of pandemic restrictions.

As explained above, while the number of entries of Russian citizens to Kazakhstan substantially increased in 2022, it remained below the pre-pandemic level. However, when we examine the *net entries*[3] of Russians to Kazakhstan in 2022, we find that it reached almost 93,000, against 17,000 in 2021, and a maximum of 12,000 in the pre-pandemic period (2016-2019). Monthly data on net entries shows a peak of more than 150,000 in September 2022 when the first partial military mobilization in Russia was announced. Another parameter reflecting war-induced emigration to Kazakhstan is the new *permanent residence permits*[4] issued to Russians: this indicator shows an increase from 3-4 thousand in 2016-2021 to 7,700 in 2022.

2 The authors are grateful to Caress Schenk and Diyas Takenov for sharing data on Kazakhstan. We didn't manage to find data on entries to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

3 Net entries, the difference between cross-border entries and exits, reflect the number of people entering who stayed in the county in a given period.

4 Permanent residence permits are usually granted for a longer period (e.g., for 10 years in Kazakhstan) and require, among other things, some minimum income level and confirmed place of residence.

The corresponding statistics for Russian citizens migrating to Kyrgyzstan are less informative though still clearly signal an increase in war-related migration from Russia to Kyrgyzstan. Entries to Kyrgyzstan, from Russia, peaked in 2022 at 446,600 (Figure 1), the number of new *registrations*[5] in 2022 was 273,000, which is 30% higher than in 2021, and the number of Russians receiving citizenship in 2022, increased to 1085, from 386 in 2021. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan data are even more limited and don't allow us to conclude beyond the increases in exits from Russia to these countries observed in Figure 1.

To understand the effects of immigration one should know not only its scale but also its composition. As aggregated migration statistics are unable to shed light on the composition of Russian emigration, evidence from existing surveys proves useful in understanding how war has shaped migration flows from Russia (see Box 1 in Annex 1 for survey details). The surveys demonstrate that typical emigrants from Russia in 2022 are much younger than the average Russian population: their mean age varies across surveys from 30 to 32.5 years (against about 40.5 years in Russia) with the dominant age group, 25-34 years. Emigrants are also better educated compared to typical Russian citizens: 70-80% have completed higher education or obtained PhD/doctorate degrees. Gender composition differs among surveys, depending on the period when the survey was conducted. Surveys conducted in the first half of 2022, immediately after the beginning of the war, report an almost equal proportion of men and women among emigrants, while surveys conducted in autumn show a higher share of men. This is an inevitable reflection of the partial military mobilization in Russia initiated in September 2022.

Surveys report that the dominant majority of emigrants come from the large Russian cities. Respondents on average report income/funds higher than the average Russian population, with 93-97% employed before their departure. Respondents also report belonging to the 'white-collar' workforce, having knowledge of English language and typically being in the IT sector, art and design, science, education, and mass media areas. In other words, the consistent headline finding from these surveys is that emigrants represent prime-age, high-skill, high-income groups mostly from the large urban centres of Russia. While this brain drain and loss of human capital should have negative consequences for Russia, the increased inflow of high human capital Russian migrants provides interesting opportunities for those countries who want to utilize benefits from the inflow of more educated and wealthier human capital from Russia.

Changes in Migration from Central Asia to Russia

There are two main reasons for migration from Central Asian countries to Russia: labour migration and the significant proportion of Russian ethnic citizens. The labour migration causes most of the migration flows from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, while the second reason is mostly observed in the case of Kazakhstan. Two data sources allow analysis of labour migration trends - statistics on entries, and residence registrations of foreign citizens. Entries from the Central Asian countries to Russia demonstrate an increase in 2022 by 50% compared to 2021. The entries for work purposes covered labour migration and showed a similar pattern (Figure 3). The number of labour entries from Central Asia increased in 2022 by almost 40% as compared to 2021 and reached 3.1 million people, the level that was observed before the pandemic. The recovery, however, differs across Central Asian countries.

5 Registrations show the number of foreigners who received an official registration at some address. The duration of the legal period of stay without any registration differs across CA countries: from up to 3 days in Kazakhstan to up to 30 days in Kyrgyzstan. Available periods of registration (or of stay after registration) differ as well: from 90 days in Kazakhstan to up to 1 year in Tajikistan.

While labour migration from Kazakhstan more than doubled from 2021 to 2022 it still didn't reach the pre-pandemic level. The number of labour entries from Tajikistan increased by about 1.5 times and visibly exceeded its pre-pandemic level, while the work-related entries from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan increased by 18% and 35% respectively, almost reaching the levels of 2019.

Figure 3. Entries of foreign citizens to Russia for work in 2019-2022, people



Source: calculated by the authors using data from the Russian FSB Border Guard Service published by Rosstat.

Figure 4. Quarterly dynamics of Central Asian citizen entries to Russia for work in 2019 and 2021-2023, people



Source: Calculated by the authors using data from the Russian FSB Border Guard Service published by Rosstat.

The dynamics of entries within 2022 do not reveal any visible impact of the war either (Figure 4). The pattern of labour entries from Kazakhstan in 2022 is similar to the pattern observed in 2021. In Kyrgyzstan, there was an unusual drop in entries in the 2nd quarter of 2022, but already in the next quarter entries sharply increased and exceeded the corresponding 2021 level. This suggests that even if some negative effect took place, it was temporal. For Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the dynamics of entries are distorted due to the low base of the 1st quarter of 2021.[6] Nevertheless, the data suggests no visible reaction of work-related entries from these countries to Russia in 2022. The first available data on entries from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for the 1st quarter of 2023 demonstrate growth compared to the 2022 level. Overall, although the chance exists that labour migration from Central Asia to Russia would have been higher if the war had not started, data on entries of Central Asian citizens to Russia in 2022 does not show any visible negative reaction to it.

Residence registration of Central Asian visitors to Russia allows for a closer analysis of how labour migration reflects immigration with long-term goals (working, studying, or business purposes). Only registrations for 9 months or longer are counted. The total number of new registrations increased in 2022 by almost 62,500, i.e., by 9.5% as compared to 2021, and reached 730,000, which is slightly higher than in 2019 (Figure 5). Approximately half of this total are accounted for by Central Asian migrants, with half of these made up of Tajik citizens. Indeed, the overall 2022 increase in Central Asian migrants to Russia is accounted for entirely by the rise in immigration from Tajikistan. The number of registered residents from Tajikistan increased by almost 60,000 and more than doubled the amount in 2019.[7] Registrations of Kyrgyz increased by a modest 1,250 (2.1%) but still exceeded the level of 2019 by 16%. The number of new registrations of Kazakhs and Uzbeks slightly declined in 2022, staying below the pre-pandemic level (Figure 5).

Figure 5. New residence registrations of foreign citizens in Russia in 2019-2022, people



Source: calculated by the authors using data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs published by Rosstat.

The number (stock) of CA citizens registered in Russia in 2022 slightly declined compared to 2021,

6 A direct flight connection between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia was opened only in April 2021.

7 Such a sharp increase in registrations of Tajiks was mentioned by Russian experts on international migration, no explanation is suggested though (see Russian Economy…, 2023).

but is significantly below the pre-pandemic level (Figure 6). Most of this decrease occurred due to the fall in Uzbek citizens registered in Russia compared with 2019. The only nationality that experienced a slight increase (by 2.2%) in 2022 were Tajiks, which is in line with data on the new registrations. Nonetheless, the number of Tajiks registered in Russia as of December 2022 still remained 6% fewer than in 2019. The number of registered migrants from other CA countries - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan - was lower in 2022 by 15%, 11%, and 5% respectively, remaining far below the corresponding 2019 figures. In sum, the available data on residence registrations, unlike statistics on only entries themselves, is suggestive of some negative reaction to the war in Ukraine.[8]

Figure 6. The number of foreign citizens in Russia in 2019-2022 (as of December 1), people



Source: calculated by authors using data from the Russian Economy… (2023)

To look for further clues, we turn now to the financial transfers plausibly linked with migration, as any changes in labour migration should be reflected in the amount of money being remitted by labour migrants. Table 1 below shows that all Central Asian countries experienced increases in the total inflow of remittances in 2022, albeit to differing degrees. The smallest increase was observed in Kyrgyzstan - by 10%, to US$3,100 mln, which is, however, 30% higher than in 2019. Although proportionally, the increase in Kazakhstan (by 55% compared to 2021) was larger than in Kyrgyzstan, the amount of remittances in 2022 was still less than in 2019 and constituted only a tiny share of the country's GDP. Leaders in terms of growth in 2022 were Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where the inflow increased by about 1.8 times as compared to 2021 and reached record high levels of 5.3 and 16.7 billion US$, respectively, equivalent to 51% and 21% of their GDPs in 2022.

8 According to the results of the Listening to Tajikistan monthly phone Survey (L2T), there was a significant increase in the number of households with at least one household member working abroad in the first half of 2022 as compared to 2021 (World Bank, 2023). For instance, in May 2021 (and also in May 2019) the percentage of such households was about 32%, whereas in May 2022 it was already 48%. This gap, however, completely disappeared in the fall of 2022, suggesting a negative reaction to the partial mobilization in Russia.

Table 1. The inflow of remittances to Central Asian countries in 2019-2022, million US dollars

Country	2019	2020	2021	2022		
				million US$	% of 2021	% of GDP
Kazakhstan	506.1	374.4	309.9	480.9	155.2	0.2
Kyrgyz Republic	2400	2400	2800	3100	110.7	27.9
Tajikistan	2300	2200	2900	5300	182.8	50.9
Uzbekistan	8500	7100	9300	16700	179.6	20.8

Source: https://www.migrationdataportal.org

All this growth was entirely driven by remittances coming from Russia. For instance, Russian remittances to the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan increased in 2022 by $480 mln (24%) and $8900 mln (160%), respectively. Such increases were disproportionately large compared to the non-obvious rise in the number of labour migrants depicted in the previous section. A significant part of the increased financial inflow, mostly likely, was associated with capital outflow or other operations from Russia and the ruble's appreciation. Unfortunately, due to the Russian Central Bank's decision to postpone the publication of statistics of cross-border money transfers after the 1st quarter of 2022 it is not possible to distinguish between transfers made by the citizens of Central Asian countries and transfers made by Russian citizens. It is therefore not possible to examine the actual changes of the amount of remittances sent by CA labour migrants to their home countries.[9]

Policy Responses of the Central Asian Governments

It is notable that the Central Asian government's reaction to the inflow of immigrants from Russia was limited to retaining status-quo in entry and stay rules.

The governments of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan did not change anything regarding the arrival of Russian citizens. In Uzbekistan, a new agreement with Russia came into force in June 2022, but was signed more than a year before that.[10] According to the agreement, Russian citizens newly arriving need to register after 15 days, in order to give access to temporary residence for up to 6 months.

Beyond that, foreign citizens can live permanently on the territory only by obtaining an identification card for foreign citizens.[11] Tajikistan granted Russian citizens visa-free entry based on a 2000 multilateral agreement comprising Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.[12] Newly arriving Russian citizens are allowed to stay for up to 90 days without a visa, after which it is required to obtain a visa according to the declared purpose - tourist visa, work visa, business, official, or diplomatic.

In August 2022, the Kyrgyz Government proactively targeted Russian IT specialists through the intro-

9 Indirect evidence available from Tajikistan suggests that some increase in the amount of remittances coming from Tajik labour migrants could have taken place. According to the World Banks' L2T survey, in Tajikistan, the share of households receiving remittances increased in 2022 to 17 percent, compared to 13 percent in 2021 (World Bank, 2023).

10 https://lex.uz/docs/6065556

11 https://lex.uz/docs/5443901

12 https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/integracionnye-struktury-prostranstva-sng/1736719/

duction of so-called ‘digital nomad status’.[13] This enabled registered ‘digital nomads’ to be exempt from registration at the place of residence, to be exempt from requiring a work permit, to be able to register a legal entity and have the right to open and use accounts in banks of the Kyrgyz Republic through a simplified procedure. Initially citizens of six countries were offered this status - Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Russia, before the list was extended, in November 2023, to include Great Britain, Germany, India, USA, South Korea and Japan. Almost 4,000 individuals have applied for digital nomad status in Kyrgyzstan and 1,588 have received this status.[14]

While Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are both members of the Eurasian Economic Union, a declared unified economic area with free movement of people and capital, applied practice differs from the declaration according to changes occurring subsequent to the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine. From the beginning of 2023 Kazakhstan change the rules for the entry and stay of immigrants. From end-January 2023, foreign citizens entering without a visa can stay for 30 days and cannot exceed 90 calendar days within a period of 180 calendar days.[15] After that period foreigners including Russian immigrants need to be registered for a permanent stay.

Kyrgyzstan adopted a revised approach in August 2023.[16] New changes proposed that decisions regarding the procedure for entry, exit, transit, movement and stay of citizens of a foreign state on the territory of Kyrgyzstan be transferred to the Cabinet of Ministers. In October the Cabinet of Ministers approved new regulations on the procedure for the stay of foreign citizens. Similarly, to the Kazakh Government decision, new rules reduce the possibility for foreigners to stay more than 90 days within a period of 180 calendar days. After that period foreign citizens need to register for a permanent stay in the country.[17]

Thus, national governments policy response was limited to an increase in monitoring the presence of Russian citizens (in the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) or any active policy decisions were absent at all (in case of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).

Discussion

In 2022, just as they were recovering from the period of pandemic, most post-soviet countries including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan experienced an unanticipated war-induced inflow of Russians.

Crude estimations based on available migration statistics suggest that around 65,000 Russians relocated to Kyrgyzstan, 75,000-100,000 to Kazakhstan, and around 100,000 to Uzbekistan. Estimates for Tajikistan are not possible due to the lack of reliable information.

Existing surveys of Russian migrants strongly agree in that this inflow mostly consists of high-skill, relatively young, and economically active people from large Russian cities. It makes observed emigra-

13 https://www.gov.kg/ru/npa/s/4053

14 https://economist.kg/novosti/2023/09/14/za-odin-ghod-status-tsifrovoi-kochievnik-poluchili-1588-spietsialistov/

15 https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/migration/press/news/details/494569?lang=ru

16 http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/112669?cl=ru-ru

17 https://mfa.gov.kg/ru/zhogorku-menyu/press-kyzmaty/novosti/kr-timinin-2023-zhyldyn-16-oktyabryna-karata-maalymattyk-bildirs?ref=economist.kg

tion potentially beneficial for the host countries and the available literature predicts the likelihood of positive medium- and long-term economic effects of this migration – including growth in entrepreneurship and new firm creation (Audretsch et al., 2010; Jahn and Steinhardt, 2023), innovations (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010), increasing overall labour productivity and economic growth (Burchardi et al., 2020; Dolado et al., 1994), and increased aggregate demand as well as influence on the labour market (Edo, 2018).

The relatively large scale of the high-skill emigration from Russia and its potentially strong influence should attract the attention of national policy makers in Central Asia. However, to the best of our knowledge, no systematic policy approach to this issue exists. Most receiving countries have broadly maintained the status quo in immigration rules and economic and social policies with respect to migration and migrants. To some extent, such policy indecision may find its explanation in politics, as this wave of migration is a sensitive political and economic issue for Russia. Equally, the explanation could be rooted in the uniqueness of the circumstances: rarely has mass immigration of high-skilled urban residents to less developed areas been historically observed.

Both economic theory and the previous experience of other host countries unambiguously suggests that this high-skill immigration should have strong potential benefits for the economic and technological development of CA countries. However, in order to realize this potential, the national economies need to develop policy measures to absorb and integrate immigration-induced high-skill labour supply. While labour demand should adjust to the increased supply of the high-skill labour through the expansion of capital and technological development in the long term (Lewis, 2011; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012), national governments need to try to facilitate this process, e.g., through credit expansion and targeted investments to the necessary infrastructures and institutional development support.

However, against this backdrop, one should not forget that this migration does not reflect a voluntary movement of labour based on usual cost-benefit economic considerations, but rather has been driven by the circumstances of war – a push factor which is beyond the control of migrants and offers an additional policy consideration for the receiving countries of CA. Previous research tends to distinguish this kind of migration from the 'standard' economic migration, as it is associated with more uncertainty, a less considered fit with the labour demand of the host countries and generally worse labour market prospects (Becker and Ferrara, 2019; Brell et al., 2020; Dustmann et al., 2017). In this regard, any non-economic policy measures that could help to reduce that uncertainty and the costs of integration of emigrants – for instance, providing information on existing immigration and residence rules and laws, granting equal access to public services and institutions, promoting anti-discrimination policies, etc. – would be positively perceived by the war-induced immigration participants.

As of the start of 2024, many Russian migrants to Central Asia have already moved to other countries or have returned back to Russia again. However, taking into account that the major war-related push factor looks like persisting for a long time and that the barriers and costs of moving to developed economies are high, it might be proposed that post-soviet countries will remain the reliable alternative for the significant part of Russian migrants (current and future too), at least in the medium term. Therefore, host countries have a unique opportunity to utilize this arrived or potential human capital for the sake of their economic development. This opportunity should not be overlooked or taken lightly.

Finally, with respect to CA migration to Russia, contrary to our original expectations, this research found no substantial decrease in the magnitude of Central Asian labour migration to Russia in 2022. However, despite the increase in cross-border crossings to Russia for job purposes, the number of CA nationals actually registered in Russia has somewhat decreased. This may indicate some wariness among labour migrants about the future of the economic and political situation in Russia. Equally, the high inflow of remittances in 2022 should not be taken at face value. It is surely misleading as it was most likely due to reasons unrelated to labour migration per se. Sadly, the data do not yet allow us to fully understand this. Indeed, as we observe this inflow declining in future, it is not yet clear whether or not this decline will involve remittances sent by CA labour migrants to their households. Either way, taking into account the high dependency on remittances from Russia, of households in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent in Uzbekistan, national governments should observe the ongoing trends and develop alternative domestic policy decisions to resolve possible problems, i.e. consider alternative labour markets in other countries, increase creation of jobs in the domestic labour markets, support labour-intensive economic activities in Central Asia.

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Box 1. Existing Surveys of Russian Emigrants

We are aware of at least three research projects providing evidence relating to Russian emigration after Feb, 2022. First, the OUTRUSH project (https://outrush.io/eng) conducted on-line surveys of people who left Russia. The survey relies on a convenience sample of 2,300 respondents in 60+ countries recruited via online relocation groups and Telegram channels. The most covered countries are Turkey (25%), Georgia (23.4%), and Armenia (15.1%) and the three CA countries – Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan – comprise about 6.1% of the total sample. To date, two survey waves were conducted, in March and September 2022. These data are complemented by a series of in-depth face-to-face interviews with recent migrants conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia during the summer, of 2022. The major results are discussed in a series of reports and working papers (e.g., see Kamalov et al., 2022, 2023).

Second, Exodus22 (https://exodus22team.wordpress.com/#about) used online surveys of around 900 Russian users of Telegram reallocation channels, in Armenia and Georgia. Two survey waves, in Spring and Autumn 2022, were conducted but results only from the first wave are publicly available.

The third project was conducted by researchers from ZOiS in Berlin. It also focuses on emigrants to Armenia and Georgia, but unlike the first two projects, it is based on face-to-face interviews conducted between November 2022 and January 2023. 853 interviews were conducted in Georgia (Tbilisi and Batumi) and 801 in Armenia (Erevan). The major results are discussed in Krawatzek, DeSisto and Soroka (2023).

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